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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suit by sellers under real estate contract for specific
performance. Summons served by publication. Counterclaim filed 5 years later but before default entered.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On motion by Plaintiff the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and the counterclaim with
prejudice over Defendant's objection.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an order reversing the order of dismissal of their counterclaim and of Plaintiffs' complaint.
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diction was acquired by publication of summons as provided in Rule 4(f) (1), URCP, but their failure to do so
constitutes an extension by Plaintiffs of the time within
which Defendants could plead. Sanders v. Milford Auto
Co., 62 U. 110, 218 P. 126. The complaint having been
filed and summons issued the action was commenced and
was still pending at the time that Defendants filed their
answer and counterclaim. Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103,
38 P. 2d 757.
Rule 41 (b) provides for involuntary dismissal, upon
motion of the defendant. The Defendants oppose dismissal and accordingly the Court was not authorized by
that rule to dismiss this action on motion of Plaintiffs.
Rule 41 ( c) makes involuntary dismissal under Rule
41 (b) applicable to counterclaims, however no grounds
specified in Rule 41 (b) are asserted by Plaintiffs in support of their motion to dismiss the counterclaim (and no
such grounds in fact exist) and the Court was not justified in dismissing Defendants' counterclaim.
Rule 41 (a) ( 2), URCP, specifies the only circumstances under which Plaintiff could obtain a dismissal of
their action after an answer and counterclaim had been
filed as in our case. That rule reads as follows:
41 (a) (2) "By Order of Court. Except as provided
in paragraph ( 1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior
to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss the action shall not be dismissed against the
'
defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants purchased the Arrowhead Hotel in St.
George, Utah, Aug. 25, 1961, on a real estate contract
(R. 4-7). During May, 1962, Plaintiffs brought this suit
for specific performance of the contract and judgment
for unpaid interest installments, 1/;3 of 1961 property
taxes, attorney fees and costs, alleging that Defendants
were then in possession of the premises (R. 1-10) and in
October, 1962, caused a receiver to be appointed to operate the hotel alleging that the property had been
abandoned by Defendants (R. 11-13), and summons to
be served by publication (R. 14-15). The receiver was
discharged in February, 1964. No further action was
taken in this matter by Plaintiffs until February, 1968,
when Plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss (R. 37-41)
after Defendants had filed an answer and counterclaim
alleging unlawful detainer and conversion of personal
property. Over Defendants objections the court dismissed
both Plaintiffs' complaint and Defendants' counterclaim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THIS
ACTION
Prior to the time Defendants filed their answer and
counterclaim Plaintiffs would have been entitled to dismiss this action by filing a notice of dismissal as provided in Rule 41 (a) (1) (i), URCP, but was without right
to dismiss suit thereafter. Rogers v. West, 82 U. 525, 25
P. 2d 971. Prior to that time Plaintiffs could have taken
judgment against the Defendants to the extent that juris-
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may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Defendants. Martin v. Stevens, 121 U. 484, 243
P.2d 747. Defendants' counterclaim states a claim for relief upon which relief can be granted, if the allegations
contained therein can be supported by evidence at a trial,
and Defendants are entitled to their day in Court to
present evidence in support of those allegations. Defendants' right to have their cause tried by the Court by
Article I, Sec. 11 of the Constitution of Utah which reads
in part as follows:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; ... "
The order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint over the
objections of Defendants under the circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion by the Court.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR
THAT MOTION OR TO DISMISS THIS ACTION
Plaintiffs' affidavits and motion (R. 47-42) are based
on alleged estoppel, which is an affirmative defense that
must be pleaded in a responsive pleading, not by motion.
Rule 12(b), URCP, lists the only defenses that may be
asserted by motion. Estoppel is not one of the defenses
available by motion and must be asserted as an affirma-
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remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice."
(Emphasis Added)
The above quoted rule limits the power of the Court
to dismiss case at the request of the Plaintiffs and over
the objections of Defendants to situations where Defendants' counterclaim remains pending for independent adjudication by the Court. The Court was not authorized
by Rule (41) (a) (2) to dismiss Defendants' counterclaim
even if the court determined that a proper case existed
for dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. Baron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 2B, P. 120 and cases
there cited. Since the Utah Rules were fashioned after
the Federal Rules it is proper to examine decisions under
the Federal Rules to determine the meanings thereof.
Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252 P.2d 205, 207.
Plaintiffs' complaint requests that Defendants spe·
cifically perform the contract between the parties. De
fendants, by their answer and counterclaim, seek to enforce their rights under that same contract and to com·
plete their purchase of the Arrowhead hotel. No act or
thing done by Plaintiffs has affected or terminated the
rights of Defendants as buyers under said real estate
contract. Defendants are entitled to litigate their rights
under that contract. The fact that the Plaintiffs may have
had a change of mind concerning the property is no just·
tification for dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim. At
most the grounds asserted by Plaintiffs would constitute
a possible defense to the counterclaim. Defendants are
entitled to have the Supreme Court review all of the
evidence, together with every logical inference which
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be asserted by a responsive pleading. Accordingly the

Court had no jurisdiction to hear said motion or to dismiss this action pursuant to that motion. Defendants are
entitled to their day in court to present evidence which
Defendants believe will clearly establish that Plaintiffs
could easily have contacted Defendants or their daughter,
who had actually managed said hotel during a substantial
part of the period during which this action was pending,
and that no proper case for an estoppel in fact exists.
The order dismissing this action should be vacated and
set aside and the case remanded to the Court for trial on
the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Defendants
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tive defense in a responsive pleading to Defendants'
counterclaim as specified in Rule 12 (b), URCP. Since the
Plaintiffs' motion is not permitted under the Rules the
Court cannot act thereon and the Court's dismissal of
this action was and is beyond the jurisdiction and power
of the Court.
Defendants should be permitted to have their day in
court and to present evidence and witnesses to establish
that no estoppel is in fact available to Plaintiffs in this
case; that during a substantial portion of the time said
lawsuit has been pending the Plaintiffs in fact knew the
address of and conversed with Defendants' daughter, who
was the person who actually operated said hotel, and
transacted business with Plaintiffs for and on behalf of
the Defendants.
SUMMARY
Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP, permits a plaintiff to dismiss
his complaint after an answer and counterclaim have
been filed only by order of the court and only if the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent ad·
judication by the court. Dismissal of Defendants' counter·
claim is in direct violation of that rule and should be reversed. Dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint for specific performance of the real estate contract was and is an abuse :
of discretion by the court since the Defendants seek by
their answer and counterclaim to perform that contract
and to complete the purchase of the hotel.
Rule 12 (b), URCP, lists the only grounds upon which
a defense may be asserted by motion. Estoppel is not one ,
of the defenses that may be asserted by motion, but must ,
I
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